My Fave Lawsuit.

>                              Teri Smith Tyler, Plaintiff,
>                                          v.
>       James Carter, William Clinton, Ross Perot, American Cyanamid, Iron
>      Mountain Security Corporation, Defense Intelligence Agency, IBM, David
>           Rockerfeller, Rockerfeller Fund, BCCI, Nasa, Defendants. 
>
>       United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
>
>                                 92 Civ. 8658 (CSH)
>
>                          Filed & Decided November 5, 1993  
>
>    Counsel:   Teri Smith Tyler, Pro Se.
>
>    Mary Jo White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
>    York, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007. 
>
>    Attorneys for Defendants President Clinton, Defense Intelligence Agency
>    and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, William J. Hoffman,
>    Esq., Assistant United States Attorney. 
>
>    Before District Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr.
>    Memorandum Opinion & Order
>
>    This case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss by defendants
>    President Clinton, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and National
>    Aeronautics and Space Administration (the "Federal defendants"). Plaintiff
>    has also filed an order to show cause why the World Trade Center Bombing
>    Trial should not be enjoined. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's
>    order to show cause is denied, and the Clerk of the Court is directed to
>    dismiss the complaint. 
>
>    BACKGROUND
>
>    Plaintiff Teri Smith Tyler, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in
>    December 1992 alleging a bizarre conspiracy involving the defendants to
>    enslave and oppress certain segments of our society. Plaintiff contends
>    she is a cyborg, and that she received most of the information which forms
>    the basis for her complaint, through "proteus", which I read to be some
>    silent, telepathic form of communication. See complaint, at 1, and
>    Affidavit accompanying November 1993 Order to Show Cause, at P g. She
>    asserts that the defendants are involved in the "Iron Mountain Plan",
>    which provides for the reinstitutionalization of slavery and "bloodsports"
>    (which she identifies as death-hunting [n1] and witch-hunting), and the
>    oppression of political dissidents, herself included. Plaintiff's
>    complaint alleges a number of personal indignities visited upon her by
>    defendants: "strafing of my dormitory room by planes and helicopters, the
>    electronic bugging of my student rooms and apartments, deliberate noise
>    harassment, blasting of loud rock music with lyrics designed for
>    witch-hunts (music about social pariahs) . . . students following me
>    around to prevent me from studying, whispering campaigns and social
>    ostrification . . ." Complaint, at 1-2. Plaintiff also makes the following
>    allegations against the defendants. Former President Jimmy Carter was the
>    secret head of the Ku Klux Klan; Bill Clinton is the biological son of
>    Jimmy Carter;  President Clinton and Ross Perot have made fortunes in the
>    death-hunting industry, and are responsible for the murder of at least 10
>    million black women in concentration camps, their bodies sold for meat and
>    their skin turned into leather products. The defendants are also
>    responsible for breeding farms, which turn out 2,000 black girls a year,
>    who are then sold for recreational murder or as human pets. Additionally,
>    the defendants utilize weather control and earthquake technology to
>    threaten other countries that object to the Iron Mountain plan. 
>
>    Plaintiff asks the Court to grant her the following relief:
>
>       1. $ 5.6 billion in compensatory and punitive damages;
>
>       2. A physical accounting of all black women born since 1940, including
>    their present whereabouts, and for those who have died, an investigation
>    into how they died; 
>
>       3. The purchase of land in Africa for the emigration of abused black
>    women; 
>
>       4. The bringing to justice of those responsible for the American
>    holocaust;
>
>       5. An investigation into the foster care system, and a physical
>    accounting of all black children placed into foster care;
>
>       6. An end to slavery in the United States;
>
>       7. The end of the cyborg program run by NASA, the Defense Intelligence
>    Agency, American Cyanimid and IBM; 
>
>       8. An end to the organ-donor program.
>
>    While plaintiff was trying to effect proper service of the summons and
>    complaint on the defendants, she made a number of appeals to the Court for
>    interim relief in the form of Orders to Show Cause. On January 20, 1993,
>    she asked the Court to enjoin the inauguration of President Clinton. The
>    Court denied her request as moot. In August, 1993, she moved to enjoin the
>    installation of Louis Freeh as Director of the FBI on the ground that
>    Clinton appointed Freeh only so Freeh could cover up evidence of Clinton's
>    wrongdoing. That motion was denied, as it lacked a sufficient evidentiary
>    basis. 
>
>    Presently before the Court is an Order to Show Cause why the Court should
>    not enjoin the trial in the World Trade Center bombing case, now
>    proceeding in this Court before Judge Duffy. Plaintiff alleges that
>    President Clinton ordered the bombing of the World Trade Center in order
>    to justify war with Iraq. In support of her application, plaintiff
>    describes certain "proteus" communications she had with other individuals.
>    Plaintiff alleges that the United States invaded Panama and arrested
>    General Noriega because Noriega objected to United States soldiers raiding
>    Indian tribes in Central America for child sex slaves to torture in
>    American cocaine based thrill-killing rackets. Plaintiff contends she
>    wrote to Noriega asking him to join in her lawsuit, but that United States
>    soldiers holding Noriega beat him when he asked for his mail. 
>
>    Plaintiff asserts that in 1988, Rajiv Ghandi spoke to her through
>    "proteus" and informed her that he was being held prisoner and sexually
>    abused by a man whom he had caught stealing from the funds generated by
>    the Bhopal disaster settlement. According to plaintiff, Yasser Arafat
>    tried to confirm Ghandi's tale of abuse on behalf of the plaintiff, to no
>    avail. 
>
>    Plaintiff additionally contends that Gulf War against Iraq was undertaken
>    so that America could restock its sexual slavery camps, which had been
>    depleted. According to plaintiff, 40,000 Iraqi soldiers captured by the
>    United States, selected for their physical attractiveness, have been
>    brought to this country where they were "being beaten, forced to run
>    gauntlets and homosexually gang-raped by American soldiers." Plaintiff
>    claims to have confronted Secretary of Defense Cheney with evidence of
>    this allegation. Cheney, through "proteus", purportedly told the
>    plaintiff, "Well, we were so sick and tired of killing black girls. We
>    just had to put some variety back into our death-hunting industry. And
>    they (Persians) are incredibly beautiful. The beauty of the face heightens
>    the pleasure of the kill. I know of no higher pleasure than the gang-rape
>    of exceedingly beautiful people."
>
>    Additionally, plaintiff alleges that the Serbian government, the "Nazi
>    Bund", the Bank of Commerce and Credit International ("BCCI") are also
>    involved in the conspiracy. 
>
>    Attached to plaintiff's papers, and apparently offered to support her
>    claim, are a number of exhibits. Most prominent among the exhibits is a
>    book by Robert Ellis Smith entitled Privacy: How to Protect What's Left of
>    It (1979), and a four page illustrated pamphlet advertising pornographic
>    movies starring young men. Plaintiff has circled a number of photos of
>    naked men who appear to be of Mediterranean or Latin American descent,
>    which I interpret as her evidence that Iraqi and Central American men are
>    enslaved in pornographic "rackets". 
>
>    Plaintiff appears to have effected service on few of the named defendants.
>    Although IBM and BCCI each made an appearance (and successfully moved to
>    have the claims against them dismissed), plaintiff never filed proof of
>    service against either defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g). Service
>    was eventually made against the Federal Defendants, but it may have been
>    effected more than 120 days after filing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j). 
>
>    IBM's motion to dismiss the complaint against it was granted by Order
>    dated September 29, 1993. That same order dismissed the claims against
>    BCCI, to the extent they could be asserted against the Superintendent who
>    was supervising the dissolution of BCCI. Currently pending before the
>    Court is a motion to dismiss by the remaining defendants, and the Order to
>    Show Cause to enjoin the World Trade Center bombing trial. 
>
>    DISCUSSION
>
>    In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827
>    (1989), a state prisoner commenced a federal action by filing a motion to
>    proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 charging
>    prison officials with violating his constitutional rights. The in forma
>    pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. s 1915(d), authorizes courts to dismiss an in
>    forma pauperis claim if, inter alia, the action is "frivolous." The
>    district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte as frivolous under s
>    1915(d) on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
>    could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
>    Procedure. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
>    court of appeals. It held that "a complaint filed in forma pauperis is not
>    automatically frivolous within the meaning of s 1915(d) because it fails
>    to state a claim." Id. at 331. 
>
>    The Court in Neitzke contrasted the judicial screening process available
>    under the in forma pauperis statute with cases where the plaintiff pays
>    the filing fees. Section 1915(d) screening reflects, the Court stated,
>    congressional recognition "that a litigant whose filing fees and court
>    costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
>    economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or
>    repetitive lawsuits." Id. at 324. A complaint filed by a fee-paying
>    litigant subject to economic incentives can be dismissed under Rule
>    12(b)(6), but in such a case, the Court stated, Rule 12(b)(6) "does not
>    countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's
>    factual allegations. District judges looking to dismiss claims on such
>    grounds must look elsewhere for legal support." Id. at 327 (footnote
>    omitted). But the Court left open the question whether a district judge
>    could ever dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 329
>    n.8 ("We have no occasion to pass judgment, however, on the permissible
>    scope, if any, of sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)."). 
>
>    Among the factual claims subject to s 1915(d) dismissal as frivolous "are
>    claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which
>    federal district judges are all too familiar." Id. at 328. The claims of
>    plaintiff at bar may be so characterized. The question is whether such
>    claims asserted by a fee-paying plaintiff are subject to sua sponte
>    dismissal by a district court under Rule 12(b)(6). I hold that they are. 
>
>    A plaintiff asserting fantastic or delusional claims should not, by
>    payment of a filing fee, obtain a license to consume limited judicial
>    resources and put defendants to effort and expense. The policies arguing
>    against sua sponte Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals do not apply in these
>    circumstances. The author of claims as irrational as these cannot be
>    regarded as subject to the economic incentive to refrain from frivolous
>    actions imposed by filing fees and court costs upon rational paying
>    litigants. Similarly, a sua sponte dismissal of a complaint such as this
>    cannot reasonably be said to deprive such a plaintiff of the opportunity
>    of "clarifying his factual allegations so as to conform with the
>    requirements of a valid legal cause of action." Neitzke at 329-30. If this
>    Court cannot order sua sponte dismissal of this complaint under Rule
>    12(b)(6), no district court can ever dismiss sua sponte any complaint
>    under the Rule.[ n2] I do not think that is the law. 
>
>    The Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss the complaint as to all
>    defendants with prejudice and without costs. The Clerk is directed to
>    refund to plaintiff her filing fee. Plaintiff's motion by Order to Show
>    Cause to enjoin the World Trade Center bombing trial is denied. 
>
>    It is SO ORDERED.
>
>    Dated: New York, New York
>    November 5, 1993
>    Charkes S, Haight, Jr., U.S.D.J.
>
>    FOOTNOTES
>
>    [n1] Death-hunting is described by plaintiff as follows: "In
>    death-hunting, teams of pimps and harriers (women working for pimps)
>    follow a black woman they want to force into sexual slavery and snuff
>    rackets, try to wreck her employment prospects, isolate her socially,
>    break her up with friends and family, often they try to force her onto
>    welfare because it often circumscribes her choice of places to live.
>    Sometimes members of a woman's family or her mate will be cooperative or
>    part of death-hunting teams because participants get paid." Complaint, at
>    4. 
>
>    [n2] Although the Federal defendants have moved to dismiss citing Rule
>    12(b)(6), I am dismissing this case sua sponte. Granting the Federal
>    defendants' motion to dismiss would affect claims against only those
>    defendants. Because I am acting sua sponte, the dismissal is effective as
>    to all of the defendants.
>